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On 26 January 2009, Nadya Suleman gave birth to eight children.  The1
public outpouring of support quickly turned into widespread condemnation as
more information about Ms. Suleman’s multiple pregnancies and financial
situation was released.  Once the public learned not only that Ms. Suleman2
had six other children but also that all fourteen children had been conceived
using in vitro fertilization, the public began to question both her judgment and
the judgment of her doctor.  The public apparently was willing to accept the3
birth if it was the non-deliberate product of a hormone-based fertility
treatment but was less willing to accept the birth if it was the result of a
deliberate choice on the part of Ms. Suleman and her physician.
Recent media attention on the Suleman Octuplets, “John and Kate Plus
8,” and other similarly situated high order births (those in which a mother
gives birth to triplets or more) has created the impression that high order births
are increasingly common. In response, the mainstream media transformed a
few high profile instances of high order births into an epidemic and has
82 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. [Vol. 5:81
4. Stephanie Saul, 21st Century Babies: The Gift of Life, and Its Price, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009,
at A1, http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2009/10/11/health/11ferti li ty.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=
the%20gift%20of%20life%20and%20its%20price&st=cse.
5. KRCG-TV, “Octo-Mom” Controversy Sparks Legal Action in Mo. (KRCG-TV television
broadcast Mar. 6, 2009) http://www.connectmidmissouri.com/news/news_story.aspx?id=269472; Kimi
Yoshino & Jessica Garrison, Stricter Rules on Fertility Industry Debated, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/06/nation/na-octuplets-laws6.
6. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
858 (1992).
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
9. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
implied that the medical community is hotly debating the proper response to
the problem.  Responding to this perceived public debate and noting public4
interest in reducing the prevalence of high order births, several state
legislatures, including California, Missouri and Georgia, are considering
statutory limitations on the use of fertility treatments.5
The state and federal governments could take a number of possible
statutory routes. The government could mandate selective reductions when
multiple pregnancies result, eliminate or restrict access to hormone-based
treatments, codify the existing medical guidelines, or take a more dramatic
route: change existing insurance law to favor those treatments least likely to
result in multiple pregnancies. Each of these options implicates significant
constitutional concerns.
In setting into statutory stone the choices available to a woman and her
doctor, the states may violate federal reproductive and substantive due process
law. Reproduction has long been held a fundamental interest, interference
with which will trigger the Equal Protection Clause’s strict scrutiny test.6
Since the days of Skinner, reproduction has become a fundamental right under
the Equal Protection Clause  although, as will become apparent, this has7
resulted in a test that turns on undue burdens rather than on strict scrutiny.
Although reproduction in the context of fundamental rights traditionally deals
with preventing and terminating pregnancies, the logic of
termination/prevention is equally applicable to the start of a pregnancy. Both
stages of reproduction implicate the same underlying fundamental interest.
Both require some medical intervention in order to achieve their ultimate
goals. Government interference with either would therefore trigger the same
level of scrutiny.
In the modern context, that level of scrutiny is the undue burden test laid
out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.  Under Casey’s model,  restrictions are8 9
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likely unconstitutional if they place a substantial and undue burden on a
woman seeking pregnancy and that burden was not supported by a substantial
and legitimate state interest. Mandated selective terminations would likely fail
under this test, as would most restrictions on access to hormone-based
therapies. In contrast, codification of existing medical guidelines and changes
to existing insurance law would likely survive Casey.
This paper addresses which paths the government may take without
violating the constitutional rights of potential parents. These possibilities are
addressed from the perspective of a married couple seeking to have a child.
The important issues presented by single women/men and by homosexual
couples seeking to have children are, unfortunately, beyond the limited scope
of this note.
The paper begins by giving an overview of relevant reproductive law. It
then discusses various methods of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ARTs)
and their side effects. The paper concludes by assessing both the
constitutionality of ARTs and four possible government responses aimed at
curbing their ill effects: (1) mandated selective terminations; (2) restricting or
eliminating access to hormone-based ARTs; (3) codification of the medical
communities standards and guidelines; (4) changes in insurance laws.
II. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT REPRODUCTIVE LAW
A. Development of Reproduction as a Fundamental Interest
Reproductive law developed under the auspices of the Equal Protection
Clause as well as under substantive due process. Beginning with 1942’s
Skinner v. Oklahoma,  the Supreme Court began to consider the reproductive10
rights of individuals. Skinner found the sterilization of certain criminals but
not others violated the Equal Protection Clause. Oklahoma justified the
sterilization on the basis that “habitual criminals” (those who have been
convicted of three felonies of moral turpitude) should not be allowed to
procreate.  The court found that this violated the Equal Protection Clause11
because the statute sterilized some classes of criminals but not others where
the crimes were otherwise punished similarly.12
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Skinner  ultimately led to the application of strict scrutiny to cases13
implicating fundamental interests. Under either a fundamental interest or a
fundamental right-based approach, governmental interference with
reproduction triggers a higher level of judicial scrutiny than does
governmental interference in other areas. Skinner  is perhaps more applicable14
to government action that limits access to ARTs because it specifically dealt
with the government taking affirmative steps to prevent certain people from
having children. Outside of Skinner, modern reproductive law focuses on the
government preventing persons from preventing/terminating pregnancies.
Given that Skinner may be the more appropriate analytical model, the
proper level of scrutiny would then fall under the Equal Protection Clause’s
strict scrutiny. In order to survive strict scrutiny, any measure taken by the
government would have to be (1) supported by a compelling and legitimate
government interest; (2) narrowly tailored; and (3) the least restrictive means
available.  Under this test, for reasons discussed infra, mandated selective15
terminations and elimination or severe restrictions of access to ARTs would
both fail. Codification of medical community standards and changes in
existing insurance laws would both pass this high level of scrutiny.
B. Development of Reproduction as a Fundamental Right
1. Foundational Cases
Since the days of Skinner, reproductive law has followed a different path.
The vast majority of cases now deal with prevention/termination of
pregnancies under the auspices of substantive due process. The right to
reproduction as a fundamental right is rooted in both substantive due process
and in the Equal Protection Clause.  Under its modern incarnation, the right16
to substantive due process rests in the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that
no person shall be deprived of his or her rights without due process of law.17
In Lochner, the Court found that the right to contract was protected under
the Fourteenth Amendment and that this right had been violated.  For the next18
fifty-years, Lochner was used to invalidate scores of legislation. The Lochner
2011] THE OCTO MOM MEETS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 85
19. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
20. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 534.
23. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74.
24. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481.
25. Id.
26. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516–22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
27. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
28. Id. at 484–85.
29. Id.
30. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
31. Id. at 454.
Era began to erode in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923)  and Pierce v. Society of19
Sisters (1925).  In Meyer, the Supreme Court struck down a law banning20
schools from teaching foreign languages to children while in Pierce the Court
invalidated a law requiring all children to attend public schools.  In each case,21
the Court protected the fundamental right of parents to rear their children
(absent unprotected criminal activity).  These holdings were carefully22
distinguished from Lochner on the basis of the right implicated. In Lochner,
only the right to economic liberty was implicated whereas in Meyer and
Pierce a much more fundamental interest—the right to rear children—was at
stake.23
Griswold v. Connecticut extended the fundamental right to rear children
to the conception of those children.  The plurality opinion found that24
irrespective of the route taken to get there, limiting access to birth control
impermissibly intruded into the privacy of the marital bedroom.  The majority25
found that although neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights expressly
lists a right to privacy, the “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance.”26
Taken together, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments
necessitate a penumbral right to privacy.  Without the right to privacy, those27
rights expressly enumerated in the Amendments would have no actual
meaning.  The Griswold majority found that the government’s interests in28
regulating access to birth control were insufficient to warrant the intrusion
into the protected rights of privacy and reproduction, which enforcing the
regulation would require.29
The decision in Eisenstady v. Baird built on this foundation and
unmoored Griswold from marriage.  No longer did the right of access to birth30
control rest on the privacy of marital relations.  This unmooring was31
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necessary because “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.”  Accordingly, the governmental interest32
was insufficiently compelling to warrant restricting access to birth control.33
2. Roe v. Wade
In light of the preceding cases, Roe v. Wade  is not as shocking a34
conclusion as it appeared when it was first announced in 1973. In Roe, the
Court held that a woman had the right to an abortion during the first
trimester.  The decision rested in the idea of bodily autonomy and the right35
of the individual to decide core values about family and reproduction. In order
to determine the impact of these notions on the question of abortion, the Court
extended and applied the Griswold concept of a right to privacy.36
In Roe, the Court noted that although the state maintains an interest in
both potential life and maternal health, at some point the state’s interest in
maternal health becomes less compelling than its interest in the potential life.37
Thus, during the First Trimester, a woman may choose to have an abortion
because at that point an abortion is safer than pregnancy and the fetus is not
viable.38
However, during the Second Trimester, access to abortion may be
restricted as long as the restrictions consider the health of the mother.  Once39
the fetus achieves viability, the state’s interest in protecting the life of the
fetus becomes compelling enough to warrant restrictions on abortion because
there is more than a moral justification under the external harm principal.  At40
that stage, a mother’s liberty interests lessen, but the compelling government
interest is insufficient to warrant protection of the fetus at the expense of the
mother’s life.41
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If, under Roe, the “right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action, as we feel it is, or, . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy[,]”  then that broad right to privacy42
should also encompass a woman’s decision as to what method of assisted
reproduction to use when beginning her pregnancy.
3. Subsequent Reproductive Rights Case Law
In the years since Roe, reproductive rights law has changed in a number
of ways. Beginning in 1992 with Planned Parenthood v. Casey  and43
continuing through the ban on partial birth abortions,  access to abortions has44
been curtailed. Irrespective of one’s position on the merits of this retreat from
unrestricted access to abortions, the fact remains that recent case law has
altered the original stance adopted in Roe.
In 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey substantially changed the Roe
framework but it did not un-ground Roe from a right to privacy.  In Casey,45
Planned Parenthood challenged Pennsylvania’s abortion law, claiming that the
law unconstitutionally limited a woman’s right to an abortion by imposing a
24-hour waiting period and spousal as well as parental consent.  The Court46
agreed, but not as broadly as Planned Parenthood desired.  The Court struck47
down the requirement of spousal notification but upheld the other portions of
the law (namely a 24-hour waiting period, informed consent, and parental
consent for minors).48
The Casey Court began by observing that although the majority of people
in the country do not favor overruling Roe, a majority does support greater
restrictions.  Accordingly, the Court held that the right to an abortion actually49
means the right to stop the state from imposing an undue burden on a woman’s
decision to have an abortion.  The state maintains a legitimate interest in50
protecting fetal life from the onset and can justify restrictions on abortions
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that stop short of being an undue burden.  However, any restrictions must51
provide for medical emergencies and protect the health of the mother.52
Similarly, in the case of ARTs, the majority of Americans appear willing
to have greater government control in the area. The public is troubled by
high-order multiples and by the short- and long-term complications many of
these children suffer. However, given the number of Americans who seek to
use ARTs each year, the public would likely be unwilling to accept either a
ban or severe restrictions on access to selected ARTs.
The Court thus substantially revised Roe v. Wade even as it ostensibly
affirmed it. The Court replaced a strict scrutiny test with one based in ‘undue
burdens.’ An undue burden, the Court wrote, was a “substantial obstacle
placed in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”53
The Court initially avoided an application of the Casey framework to
partial birth abortion legislation.  In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court did not54
find it necessary to apply the Casey framework to the law because the law
failed to adequately provide for an exception when the health of the mother
is at risk.  The Court invalidated the law on that basis without addressing the55
underlying issue of whether partial birth abortions should be available.56
Seven years later, the Court could not avoid the confrontation. In applying
Casey, the Court in Carhart v. Gonzales significantly retreated from the large
fraction analysis.  In an opinion replete with references to maternal love and57
the regret women feel after an intact dilation and excavation (D&E) partial
birth abortion, the Court upheld the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban in spite
of the arguably insufficient exception for preservation of the mother’s health.58
The Court felt that intact D&E is never medically necessary and that basic
D&E is always as safe as intact.  This decision was reached without a59
consensus within the medical community concerning whether intact D&E is
ever medically necessary. Further, the testimony in favor of the ban generally
came from non-experts.  By finding that intact D&E is never medically60
necessary, the Court summarily eliminated those women for whom intact
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D&E would be medically necessary or preferable from consideration. Thus,
there was no large fraction affected by the law, making any assessment under
Casey moot.
The danger of Gonzales is not its affirmation of a ban on intact D&E.
Rather, its danger lies in the justifications for that affirmation and its
willingness to assume a paternalistic approach to intimate medical decisions.
In assuming that a woman will regret her decision and using this assumption
to validate its decision, the Court intrudes on her liberty and right to make
decisions about her own life, whether or not she will later have regrets about
her decision. The Court’s willingness to make and use such assumptions has
implications outside of abortion law. In the context of governmental intrusion
into assisted reproduction, this willingness implies that the Court would be
willing to find that women would regret having high order multiples and that
this regret would validate (at least partially) government imposed limits on
access to fertility treatments.
III. OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE FERTILITY TREATMENTS AND
ASSOCIATED RISKS
Fertility treatments have been available for nearly as long as abortion has
been legal. Like abortions, determining which fertility treatment to use is a
very patient-specific decision.  Before beginning a course of treatment, the61
American Society for Assisted Reproduction mandates that couples receive
counseling about both the medical treatments available and any possible side
effects.  During this consultation, a physician discusses the possibility of62
multiple births and the side effects inherent therein.  Pre-term delivery with63
its associated risks of low birth weight and physical/mental developmental
impairments, Cesarean sections, increased risk of pre-eclampsia and
gestational diabetes are all discussed.  The physician may also go over the64
financial and emotional burdens inherent in caring for multiple infants/young
children, including an increased divorce rates for couples with multiple birth
children.65
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The goal of this discussion is for the woman or couple to make an
informed decision about the course of treatment.  However, “at the end of the66
day these couples are so desperate to have a baby that they can’t even really
think about the physical and emotional side effects. So how good is their
consent?”  Ultimately, desire and bias aside, these women and couples have67
been made fully aware of the risks they face. They accept the consequences
of their actions and choose, under the consultation of their doctors, a course
of treatment that works best for them as individuals.
Fertility Treatments
Interuterine Insemination
As the name implies, interuterine insemination involves the fertilization
of an egg or eggs within the uterus.  A woman undergoes one of several68
hormone therapies to stimulate the maturation of egg follicles.  In the United69
States, doctors typically halt hormone therapy when four egg follicles reach
maturity, although in Europe doctors typically halt at three.70
At this point, either the woman and her partner engage in timed
intercourse or the woman is injected with a cleaned sperm sample.  A71
successful pregnancy occurs approximately 15% after a single cycle but
increases to 50% after three.  If the process creates more than one or two72
viable embryos, which it does 23-30% of the time, the woman is given the
option of selective reduction.  Many women opt for the procedure and give73
birth to either a singleton or twins.74
Hormone therapy coupled with interuterine insemination is more likely
to result in high order multiples than is in vitro fertilization (discussed in
greater detail infra).  Doctors generally prefer to use in vitro fertilization75
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because the process gives them greater control over the outcomes, but
interuterine insemination is often a better, or the only viable, option.  Some76
couples may have religious objections to fertilization taking place outside of
the mother while others may be faced with significant financial limitations.77
Financial concerns are often a primary reason for opting for hormone therapy
coupled with interuterine injection.  Each cycle costs between $200-30078
without hormones and around $5,000-6,000 with hormone treatment.79
Although this is high, the figure is far lower than the $9,000+ per cycle cost
of in vitro fertilization.80
In Vitro Fertilization
Interuterine insemination works well for many women but not for all. It
is ineffective for women who suffer from tubal blockage or severe tubal
damage, ovarian failure (menopause), and advanced stages of endometriosis.81
It is also ineffective if the male suffers from severe male factor infertility.  In82
these cases, doctors have no option but must resort to in vitro fertilization.83
In vitro fertilization is similar to inter-uterine insemination in that it
begins with giving the mother hormones to stimulate the maturation of egg
follicles.  The eggs are then harvested from the woman and combined with84
a cleaned sperm sample.  From here, three different methods of in vitro85
fertilization emerge: Gamete Intrafallopian Tube Transfer (GIFT), Zygote
Intrafallopian Transfer (ZIFT), and traditional.  After one to six days of86
traditional in vitro fertilization, fertilized eggs are either implanted in the
woman or frozen.  The American Society for Reproductive Medicine87
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(ASRM) recommends implanting no more than three embryos at a time.  As88
with interuterine insemination, if multiple embryos attach and become viable,
the mother may choose selective termination.  Most women opt for the89
selective termination procedure.  Unlike interuterine insemination, selective90
termination is rarely necessary given that few doctors will implant more than
one or two embryos per cycle.91
Gamete Intrafallopian Tube Transfer (GIFT) is a ‘hybrid’ of interuterine
insemination and traditional in vitro fertilization.  As with traditional in vitro92
fertilization, a woman is given hormones to stimulate the production of eggs,
and the mature eggs are removed from the woman.  The eggs are then93
combined with mobile sperm, and the mixture is immediately injected into the
woman’s fallopian tubes.  As with interuterine insemination, this procedure94
runs a higher risk of producing multiples.  GIFT is recommended for women95
who did not succeed with interuterine insemination but who do not have
severe fertility problems.96
If interuterine insemination and GIFT both fail to produce a successful
pregnancy, a doctor may recommend that a patient try a Zygote Intrafallopian
Transfer (ZIFT).  ZIFT follows the same procedures as GIFT and traditional97
in vitro up to the point of fertilization.  With ZIFT, the egg is fertilized98
outside of the woman and then implanted. Unlike traditional in vitro, the
embryo is implanted into the fallopian tubes.99
The success rate for in vitro fertilization is much higher than interuterine
insemination. It results in live birth in 22% of cases after three cycles, and as
high as 72% after six.  However, the increased success rate comes at a high100
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price. Each round of implantation costs an average of $12,000-plus.  Most101
insurance plans will only cover a single cycle, and given that there is a lower
chance of initial success, this insurance shortcoming pushes many couples
toward interuterine insemination.102
Side Effects of Multiple Births
Premature delivery is one of the main side effects of high order multiple
birth. All of the other “side effects” are actually caused by preterm delivery.
Twins carry a 60% chance of pre-term delivery.  With triplets, the likelihood103
of a preterm delivery increases to over 90%.  Of the 137,085 twins born in104
2006, 23,284 were conceived using in vitro fertilization.  The Bureau of105
Vital Statistics found that “less than 20 percent of all triplets/+ born between
1997-2003 are estimated to have been naturally conceived.”  Nationwide,106
12.7% of births occur prematurely, and the use of fertility treatments has
increased this figure by 36% over the past twenty-five years.107
Preterm infants are also more likely to have a low birth weight compared
to full-term infants.  Low birth weight is defined as below 5.5 pounds.108 109
These children “are at increased risk of health problems in the newborn period
as well as lasting disabilities, such as mental retardation, cerebral palsy, and
vision and hearing loss.”110
The high rate of premature birth and accompanying low birth weights
among infants conceived using ART is a contributing factor to the United
States’ high infant mortality rate, albeit a very minor one given the number of
births.  The United States ranks thirty-third in infant mortality, with nations111
such as Cuba ranking above us.  Understandably, the federal government112
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made reducing this rate a national priority. In addition to the humanitarian
incentives for reducing the rate of premature delivery, there are very real
economic incentives for reaching the same end because caring for premature
infants born as a result of in vitro fertilization alone costs an estimated $1
billion. These are “expenses that eventually get passed along through the
system and on to businesses and the consumer.”113
Caring for twins born as a result of fertility treatments could be more
expensive, financially and emotionally, than caring for naturally occurring
twins.  A recent study published in the Journal of Human Reproduction, a114
leading publication in Europe, found that twins born as a result of assisted
reproductive therapy (ART) were significantly more likely to die within a
month of birth, spent on average four more days in the hospital and suffered
from longer term health problems more often than naturally occurring twins.115
The same journal published the results of study in 2008 indicating that
singletons born as a result of ARTs were “more likely to suffer from twice the
risk of some types of heart defects, more than twice the risk of cleft lip with
or without cleft palate and over four times the risk of certain gastrointestinal
defects compared with babies conceived without fertility treatments.”116
However, the study noted that the absolute risk of any birth defect remained
very low.  The study also observed that children born of ART induced117
multiple pregnancies suffered no increased risk of birth defects.118
Medical Community’s Response
The totality of these side effects is such that the issue is not whether
action ought to be taken to limit the number of multiples (high order or
otherwise) born each year but rather by whom the action should or may be
taken. In response to these side effects, the medical community implemented
its own regulations and procedures designed to reduce the occurrence of
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multiples.  These measures include counseling at the start of fertility119
treatment, placing limits on the number of embryos transferred during IVF
(currently, three at most), setting limits on when a woman may be given
hormonal therapy and on how many egg follicles should be permitted to
develop as a result.  Given the dramatic decrease in the incidents of high120
order multiples in recent years, it appears these guidelines achieved their
desired effect.121
IV. ASSESSMENT OF LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON
FERTILITY TREATMENTS
A. Introduction
In order to capitalize upon the success of the medical community in
limiting high order births, the state and federal governments should expand the
limitations placed by the medical community on the number of viable embryos
a mother may carry. To achieve this, state and federal governments should
mandate selective reduction, eliminate the use of hormone-based fertility
treatments, codify the medical community’s own standards, or take a more
radical approach: change existing insurance laws.
Any measure must survive at the very least Casey’s undue burden test122
because each solution touches on the right of a couple to beget children.
Measures mandating selective termination and eliminating hormone-based
fertility treatments would likely fail that test while codification of existing
medical community standards and changes in insurance laws would likely
pass. Alternatively, a measure may be subject to the higher strict scrutiny test
under a Skinner analysis.  The results of this analysis would be the same123
with measures mandating selective termination and eliminating hormone-
based fertility treatments failing the test and codification of existing medical
community standards and changes in insurance laws passing it.
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B. Possible Legislative Actions
1. Mandated Abortions
The first ‘option’ can be dismissed out of hand. Constitutional and public
policy arguments aside, practically speaking no state or federal representative
endorsing such a law or regulation would be employed for long. Considering
both Constitutional and public policy arguments, mandated selective
termination violates a host of constitutional rights, privacy among them. From
a policy standpoint, the United States has never intruded into the private lives
of its citizens so deeply, and, frankly, it never should.
2. Elimination or Sever Restriction of Access of Hormone-Based
Fertility Treatments
Although others have argued that the elimination or near elimination of
hormone-based fertility treatments would be a viable and constitutional
option,  recent changes to both the data regarding children born of hormone-124
based ARTs  and the rates of multiple births (high order or otherwise)125 126
undermine the justifications for such a dramatic measure. Even without these
developments, restrictions on access to hormone-based fertility treatments
would be largely unconstitutional under either Casey’s undue burden test127
or under an Equal Protection Clause strict scrutiny analysis.128
ARTs are very different than other forms of medical treatment because
of their ultimate goals: infertility and the creation of a human being. Treating
ARTs and their regulation as if they are no different than blood pressure
medication is a mischaracterization and diminution of the ultimate issues
involved. ARTs implicate reproductive rights, which the Supreme Court has
recognized as a fundamental right,  let alone a fundamental interest.  As129 130
such, any regulation of ARTs must survive Casey’s tweaking of strict
scrutiny.131
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Substantive Due Process Based Claims
Although the majority of Americans appear willing to have greater
government control in ARTs, as the Court in Casey observed was true of
restricting access to abortions, the constitutionality of placing significant
limits on access is questionable. The public is troubled by high-order multiples
and by the short and long-term complications many of these children suffer.
However, given the number of Americans who seek to use ARTs each year,
the public would likely be unwilling to accept either a ban or severe
restrictions on access to selected ARTs. 
Restricting or eliminating access to hormone-based ARTs fails Casey’s
undue burden test  for a number of reasons. First, scaling back access places132
an undue burden on a couple seeking to have a child because some women can
conceive only through hormone-based ARTs.  If an approved medication133
does not work but a non-approved one would, the woman will not be able to
have a child. These procedures are also a necessary first step in the in vitro
processes.  Eliminating or severely restricting access to hormone-based134
therapies would therefore eliminate or restrict access to ‘non-hormone’ based
ARTs as well. These roadblocks amount to placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a couple seeking to have a child.
Beyond placing an undue biological burden on certain couples, restricting
or eliminating access to hormone-based ARTs would place an undue financial
burden on many more couples. The in vitro process costs upwards of $12,000
per cycle.  The average couple requires four cycles in order to achieve135
pregnancy and few insurance companies are willing to cover the process. For
couples who lack coverage, the hormone-based ARTs are a viable financial
option, and are often their only one.
Any measure seeking to limit or eliminate access must sufficiently
address this issue in order to be valid under Casey,  even though136
socio-economic class is not recognized as a protected class. The actual issue
in this case is not the financial classification of the couple but rather whether
a government action has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
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in the path of a couple seeking to have a child. Pretending otherwise is a gross
mischaracterization of the issue.
Equal Protection Clause Based Claims
These measures would face similar challenges under the Equal Protection
Clause’s strict scrutiny test. If the Court follows Skinner  because of the137
factual similarities between that case’s sterilization of certain convicts and
restricting/eliminating access to certain infertile couples, then the government
action must pass a higher standard than the undue burden test laid out in
Casey  to be valid.138
Government interest would have to be legitimate and compelling,
narrowly tailored, and the least intrusive means available.  In the realm of139
ARTs, the legitimacy of the government interest is questionable because there
is insufficient proof that governmental intervention is needed and because the
relationship between that interest and the measures implemented in its name
would be so extreme as to be irrational. Eliminating or restricting access to
hormone-based ARTs in order to reduce the number of children born who
suffer long-term health problems incurred as a result of a multiple pregnancy
would be analogous to eliminating or restricting access to fast food in order
to reduce the number of Americans who suffer long-term health problems
incurred as a result of obesity.
Children suffer serious health problems regardless of whether they are
born as a result of ARTs. If the government may constitutionally justify
eliminating a method of procreation on the basis of possible adverse health
effects in some cases where ARTs are used, the government rides a slippery
slope toward justifying limiting the ability of couples that may have children
with long-term health problems from having children. The justifications for
each limitation would be the same—a government concern for the long-term
health of children. The difference would be the method of producing those
children.
The otherwise compelling nature of the government interest is also
weakened by the successful reductions in multiple births (high order or
otherwise) the medical community guidelines have accomplished. Given that
the incidence of such births (and with them their side-effects) is on the
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decline,  the ostensibly compelling nature of the government’s interest is140
weakened.
The efficacy of those guidelines also calls into question whether
restriction/elimination of access to hormone-based ARTs would be narrowly
tailored and if such action would be the least restrictive means available.
Given the success of the guidelines and that they operate without severely
restricting/eliminating access to hormone-based ARTs, government action
doing so would be both insufficiently narrow and not the least restrictive
means available.
3. Codification of Medical Community Standards
Codification of existing medical community standards would be
sufficiently narrow, and it would pass the rational basis and undue burden
tests, but it could only go so far. These guidelines successfully reduced the
incidents of multiple births since their inception.  Codification of these141
standards would standardize such progress but would not necessarily
capitalize upon it.
Codification of existing standards passes both the undue burden and strict
scrutiny tests. If doctors are unwilling to go beyond the guidelines out of a
concern derived from professional reputation and medical risks, then a couple
seeking ARTs would not be presented with an undue burden on their quest by
governmental regulations/statutes limiting their access to those ARTs of
which the medical community approves. The couple would be unable to
access the therapies with or without the governmental actions. Thus, the
government places no additional and no undue burden upon them.
Several states have already codified these provisions but the efficacy of
these measures remains uncertain. Further complicating the situation,
codification would need to be performed in such a way as to ensure that when
the medical community standards evolved, the law could evolve with it.
Absent such fluidity, the government runs the risk of creating legal obligations
to engage in medical practices that have been discredited.
100 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. [Vol. 5:81
142. Telephone Interview with Melanie M. Ochalski, MD, supra note 61.
143. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-85-137, 23-86-118 (2009); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55
(2009); 1989 Conn. Acts 05-196; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431-IOA-116.5, 432.1-604 (2010); 215 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/356, 125/5-3 (2010); MD. CODE ANN., Ins. § 15-810 (2010), HEALTH-GEN. § 19-706 (2010);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-22-1521, 33-31-102 (2009).
4. Changes in Existing Insurance Laws
Codification of these standards would be a good first step but it would
only go so far. In order for the government to continue the success of the
ASRM guidelines, it must change the existing insurance laws. Physicians and
patients alike already prefer the use of in vitro fertilization to hormone-based
methods, all other factors being equal.  The doctor has greater control over142
the results of the process and thereby greater control over any possible risks.
The patient has a more guaranteed result and is not exposed to the sort of side
effects associated with hormone-based ARTs.
Patients and doctors, however, must consider factors other than the best
course of treatment. They must also consider the patient’s ability to pay. In
vitro fertilization is expensive at between $12,000 and $15,000 a cycle. In
those states that do mandate its coverage, it is covered only as a last resort.143
In contrast, hormone-based ARTs may cost as little as $200-$300 a cycle.
Changing the incentives for choosing ARTs methods to favor the more
expensive but generally less risky in vitro would lead many patients and
doctors to choose in vitro first.
In order for any measure to have real efficacy, the statute or regulation
must have two prongs. First, the measure would have to mandate coverage of
fertility treatments. Without this change, couples lacking coverage and lacking
significant amounts of disposable income would turn first to hormone-based
ARTs. Second, the measure must mandate that in vitro and its progeny should
be covered as a first option and not as a last resort.
The change in coverage does not necessarily entail that all forms of ARTs
cost the patient the same amount. The changes simply mean that the out of
pocket expenses decrease and in vitro would be given a first option status,
which in turn would likely lead to a decrease in the use of hormone-based
ARTs. If these two prongs were established, the likelihood of high-order
multiples would decrease precipitously.
2011] THE OCTO MOM MEETS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 101
V. CONCLUSION
Of the four possible government responses to the risks recreated by
multiple pregnancies produced as a result of ARTs examined in this paper,
only two can withstand Casey’s undue burden test and/or strict scrutiny under
an Equal Protection claim. Taken either separately or together, codification of
existing medical community standards and changes in insurance laws that
favor the use of in vitro fertilization over hormone-based ARTs manage to
withstand constitutional challenges and would likely produced the desired
results.
